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THE IMPORTANCE OF MYSTERY 
FOR THE LIFE OF FAITH
Merold Westphal
That the life of Christian faith needs to understand itself as dwelling in 
the realm of mystery, of that which exceeds and overwhelms any language 
and concepts with which we seek to understand it, is suggested at three 
sites in continental philosophy of religion: Heidegger’s critique of onto-
theology, Marcel’s distinction between problems and mysteries, and Mari-
on’s distinction between idol and icon, along with his account of the saturat-
ed phenomenon. All three see the category of mystery as much wider than 
its religious usage but as crucial for a proper understanding and practice of 
Christian faith.
A Way that can be followed is not a constant Way
A name that can be named is not a constant name.
Nameless, it is the beginning of Heaven and earth;
Named, it is the mother of the myriad creatures.
And so,
 Always eliminate desires in order to observe its mysteries;
 Always have desires in order to observe its manifestations.
—The Daodejing of Laozi1
We are oft en told these days that the barriers between “analytic” and “con-
tinental” philosophy have been breached and that neither world has the 
form of a windowless monad. This is good news, and there is a lot of truth 
in it. But there remain diﬀ erences, not only in the questions asked but also 
in the methods and vocabularies and bibliographies employed in address-
ing them. In this regard the philosophy of religion is no exception. The 
fl ourishing continental philosophy of religion industry, sometimes called 
“the religious turn in continental philosophy” or “the theological turn in 
phenomenology,” is a diﬀ erent world from the more widespread world of 
mainstream philosophy of religion.
But not absolutely diﬀ erent. There is ongoing interest in the question 
of mystery on both sides of the levee that separates the waters of the deep 
from the dry land (however much they are beginning to leak).2 The theme 
of mystery in its theological signifi cance has come front and center on 
the continental scene in at least three scenes, each of which can be read 
against the background of Rudolf Ott o’s defi nition of the holy as the myste-
rium tremendum et fascinans, the “Wholly Other” that is at once fascinating 
and frightening.
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In addition to this dialectic of att raction and repulsion, there is the 
dialectic of the rational and the supra-rational. The Wholly Other is not 
wholly Wholly Other. It is rational insofar as it is amenable to conceptual 
att ribution and linguistic predication. But it is supra-rational, and thus 
mysterious, in that it exceeds, even explodes the understanding born by 
att ribution and predication. “The truly ‘mysterious’ object is beyond our ap-
prehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain 
irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently 
‘wholly other’, whose kind and character are incommensurable with our 
own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill 
and numb.”3
**********
Our fi rst scene is Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology in association with 
his critique of modern technology. Drawing on Aristotle’s metaphysics, he 
notes that the att empt to think being qua being (ontology) ends up need-
ing a Highest Being, the Unmoved Mover (theology) to complete it: thus 
metaphysics becomes onto-theology.4 So we can defi ne onto-theology as 
the claim that there is Highest Being that is the key to the meaning of the 
whole of being. I say “that” instead of “who” because, while many diﬀ er-
ent actors have played the role of Highest Being, as Heidegger notes, they 
are typically impersonal.5
If we ask at this point what Heidegger fi nds problematic about onto-
theology, we get a one word answer: Seinsvergessenheit. When philosophy 
gives itself over to thinking the Highest Being, it forgets its highest task, 
which is to think being as such. This turns out to be a very weak objection, 
as I have argued elsewhere.6 But we need not linger on it, since it deals 
only with an partial and preliminary account of onto-theology. We get to 
the heart of the matt er when we see that Heidegger is most deeply con-
cerned not with the “what” of onto-theology” but with its “how.” Thus he 
completes his defi nition with the notion that onto-theology occurs when 
“the deity can come into philosophy only insofar as philosophy, of its 
own accord and by its own nature, requires and determines that and how 
the deity enters into it” (ID 55–56). In other words, metaphysics becomes 
onto-theology when it requires that our God-talk submit to philosophy’s 
rules and serve its project.
This project, as Heidegger understands it, can be identifi ed in terms of 
its end, its means, and its results. Its goal is to make the whole of being 
wholly intelligible and transparent to human understanding. Metaphys-
ics is allowed a theological dimension (some Highest Being) just to the de-
gree that the latt er successfully serves this goal. The means employed are 
abstract and impersonal metaphysical categories, such as causa sui, causa 
prima, and ultima ratio, in conjunction with the principle of suﬃ  cient rea-
son.7 Heidegger calls this “calculative” and “representational” thinking, 
which, like the thinking of modern technology, seeks to have its “object” 
at its disposal.8 The result, following from the intention, is the loss of mys-
tery in relation to the whole of being, including, of course, the Highest 
Being.9 “Thus where everything that presences exhibits itself in the light 
of a cause-eﬀ ect coherence, even God can, for representational thinking, 
lose all that is exalted and holy, the mysteriousness of his distance . . . God 
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can sink to the level of a cause. . . . He then becomes, even in theology, the 
god of the philosophers”10
Here Heidegger sounds like Pascal and he evokes a tradition that in-
cludes Tertullian, Luther, Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth. He insists that his 
critique is not motivated by “any kind of atheism” (ID 55) and that it “is 
absolutely not in any way an att ack against what is Christian.”11 Although 
he does not write as a Christian, he argues that the Christian theologian 
should embrace his critique of the arrogance of thinking we can have God 
at our conceptual disposal, since such a “god” is religiously useless. “Man 
can neither pray nor sacrifi ce to this god [of onto-theological philosophy]. 
Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he 
play music and dance before this god.” Thus the critique of onto-theology 
may bring us “closer to the divine God” (ID 72). Onto-theology
is due to the manner in which beings as beings have revealed 
themselves from early on. It was this unconcealedness of beings 
that fi rst provided the possibility for Christian theology to take 
possession of Greek philosophy—whether for bett er or for worse 
may be decided by the theologians on the basis of their experience 
of what is Christian, in pondering what is writt en in the First Epistle 
of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians. . . . “Has not God let the 
wisdom of this world become foolishness?” (I Corinthians 1:20). The 
sofija tou` kojsmou [wisdom of the world], however, is that which, 
according to 1:22, the  {Ellhne~ zhtou`sin, the Greeks seek . . . Will 
Christian theology one day resolve to take seriously the word of the 
apostle and thus also the conception of philosophy as foolishness?” 
(WM/1949 288)
Heidegger is a kind of Kantian for whom God both is and is not a spe-
cial case. For Kant, both the things that appear to the senses, giving rise to 
phenomenal knowledge, and the properly metaphysical realities that do 
not so appear, namely God, freedom, and immortality, are unavailable to 
human understanding as they are in themselves. Whatever “knowledge” 
we may have of them, its justifi cation is not that of truth in the classical 
sense of adequatio rei et intellectus. But God, freedom, and immortality are 
a special case because of their importance for practical reason, both as 
religion and as morality.
Similarly, for Heidegger, the emergence of all beings into unconceal-
ment has an inseparable fl ip side of concealment. This means that the 
whole of being is shrouded with an aura of mystery that properly evokes 
awe and wonder,12 which are ever threatened both by onto-theologically 
constituted metaphysics and by technologically constituted modern sci-
ence. Yet God is a special case, at least for those who profess Christian 
faith. For if the revealed God is not simultaneously the hidden God, the 
life of faith is itself threatened.13 God escapes unemployment only by 
playing the servant role to philosophy’s human, all too human project of 
conceptual mastery.14 Heidegger might have noted that this is not what 
the Servant Songs of Isaiah are about, nor what Jesus had in mind when 
he said that he came “to serve and to give his life a ransom for many” 
(Mark 10:45).
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As indicated above, Heidegger is concerned about the danger to the 
practices of faith: prayer, sacrifi ce, music, and even dance. He agrees with 
the psalmist, or at least he expects the Christian to agree with the psalmist, 
who writes
I shall never want to defi ne You, O God,
For I cannot worship what I comprehend.15
The sacred is indeed the mysterium, that which remains concealed even in 
its unconcealment (Ex. 33); to deprive it of this character is to secularize it, 
to transform the religious life into a pale simulacrum.
But Heidegger also understands the issue epistemologically. The apos-
tle writes that “we walk by faith, not by sight” (2 Cor. 5:7). Onto-theology 
can be understood as the arrogant, even monstrous demand that faith be 
converted into sight by the powers of human reason (see OO 12).16 “Man 
becomes the relational center of that which is as such . . . man contends for 
the position in which he can be that particular being who gives the mea-
sure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is.”17 Spinoza and 
Hegel let the cat out of the bag when they respectively describe the task 
and accomplishment of speculative philosophy as seeing the world “sub 
specie aeternitatis” and as “absolute knowing.” The gap between human 
knowledge and divine knowledge is erased. It is to protect against this 
world historical hubris that the word of the cross (oJ lojgos tou` staurou`) 
must remain foolishness “to those who are perishing” and, conversely, the 
wisdom of the world, aft er which the Greeks seek and which Heidegger 
calls onto-theology, must remain foolishness in the eyes of faith vis-à-vis 
the wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:18–25). A faith that meekly conforms to the 
demands of philosophy in its onto-theological mode (mood) is a salt that 
has lost its taste and will be, all too deservedly, “thrown out and trampled 
under foot” (Matt . 5:13).
Some will get nervous at the idea, however biblical, of deliberately giv-
ing up on adequation and absolute knowing. Are we not opening our-
selves to the ravages of relativism? The problem with the vehement insis-
tence, “There is absolute truth,” is that it is all but invariably followed by 
the claim, “and I and those who agree with me are its incarnation.” One 
reply to this is calmly to observe that within a theistic framework, and 
a fortiori within a Christian framework, we are relative and only God is 
absolute. To acknowledge that God doesn’t fi t without remainder into our 
metaphysical matrices is to acknowledge that in our fi nitude and in our 
fallenness our understanding is always relative to factors that make it both 
possible and necessary for the prophet to write:
For my thoughts are not your thoughts,
 nor are your ways my ways, says the Lord;
For as the heavens are higher than the earth,
 so are my ways higher than your ways,
 and my thoughts than your thoughts. (Isa. 55:8–9)18
There is another reply to the understandable anxiety over relativism 
and the arrogance into which it so readily reverts that is worth mentioning. 
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Some years ago Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. gave an address at Brown Univer-
sity, a commencement address if I remember correctly. It came in the midst 
of culture wars in which great concern was being voiced about the perils of 
relativism. He made what he took to be a fairly non-controversial histori-
cal observation, namely that the perpetrators of the great atrocities of the 
twentieth century were not relativists but absolutists, people and parties 
who took themselves to be the sites of absolute knowing, to be the possess-
ors and embodiment of an absolute truth. At the time I thought the point 
well taken. Several years later I met Schlesinger at a reception and brought 
the subject up. He told me that he had received so much grief over the com-
ments that he no longer felt free to say what he then said, though he didn’t 
doubt its correctness. Like the emperor’s really serious wardrobe malfunc-
tion, there seem to be some facts that simply must not be stated.
Since that time the term ‘fundamentalism’ has, for bett er or worse, 
come to signify the att itude of those who take themselves to be possess-
ors of a truth so absolute that their project becomes the end which justi-
fi es virtually any means. These means are oft en violent, both literally and 
rhetorically.19 Heidegger’s critique of metaphysical/theological absolutism 
is a protest, and perhaps an antidote to those fundamentalisms, whether 
Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, or secular that arrogate to 
themselves fi rst the power to defi ne the truth and then the right to destroy 
those perceived to be its enemies. Christian philosophers do well to be 
careful, perhaps with a litt le help from Heidegger, lest in their zeal for ab-
solute truth they give epistemic aid and comfort to those whose violence 
stems from confusing themselves with God.
**********
Another site at which the theme of divine mystery emerges is Gabriel 
Marcel’s distinction between mystery and problem. As with Heidegger, 
the analysis has theological ramifi cations; but just as for Heidegger the 
whole of being emerges but partially out of a cloud of unknowing, so for 
Marcel the mysteries of faith are far from being the only ones. He lists such 
standard metaphysical issues as life, especially birth and death, evil, the 
relation of body to soul, sensation, freedom, and truth as properly belong-
ing to the category of mystery. An utt erly fundamental mode of mystery 
is presence in its non-spatial sense, and Marcel itemizes various modes of 
presence: faith, hope, love, fi delity, creativity, availability, family, a sleep-
ing child, hospitality. If we would understand love in the mode of faith in 
the absolute Thou, “that which is expressed in the Fiat voluntas tua of the 
Lord’s Prayer,”20 we will need to see how both the intentional act and the 
intentional object of the believer as such belong together with all these 
other modes of mystery.21
The “data of Christianity” may inspire thought to distinguish mystery 
from problem, but the analysis is phenomenological and not theologi-
cal, that is, it does not presuppose faith. Nor does it prove the truth of 
faith, though “it enables those who have att ained it to perceive the pos-
sibility of a revelation in a way which is not open to those who have never 
ventured beyond the frontiers of the realm of the problematical and who 
have therefore never reached the point from which the mystery of being 
can be seen and recognized.”22 While the mystery of God as the Absolute 
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Thou is always just inches below the surface, it only rarely emerges into 
explicit view.
So what is a mystery, and how is it distinguished from a problem? A 
problem is what can be solved, at least in principle; thus it is inherently 
temporary. Something is missing, typically a cause. When that is found, 
whether theoretically or practically, the problem is no longer a problem. 
Science and technology are the paradigmatic realms of problem solving. 
Problems occur in the kind of subject-object relation that Buber calls I-it 
relations. On the objective side are data, calculation, probability, abstract 
concepts, and objective validity. On the subjective side are, in part desire 
and fear, and in part the impersonal detachment of the spectator or on-
looker seeking to master whatever is feared or desired. Marcel writes,
The world of the problematical is the world of fear and desire, which 
are inseparable; at the same time . . . it is the kingdom of technics of 
whatever sort. Every technique serves, or can be made to serve, some 
desire or some fear; conversely, every desire as every fear tends to 
invent its appropriate technique. From this standpoint, despair con-
sists in the recognition of the ultimate ineﬃ  cacy of all technics, joined 
to the inability or the refusal to change over to a new ground—a 
ground where all technics are seen to be incompatible with the fun-
damental nature of being, which itself escapes our grasp. (PE 30)
By contrast, Marcel defi nes a mystery as “a problem which encroaches 
upon its own data (PE 19).23 The meaning of this is not immediately appar-
ent, but may become a bit clearer in the light of two further descriptions. 
A mystery is “based on a datum which is not transparent to refl ection” 
and which becomes “an antinomy as soon as discursive thought tries 
to reduce or problematize it” (CF 23). Further, a mystery is “a problem 
which encroaches on its own immanent conditions of possibility” (CF 69). 
In other words, both subject and object are diﬀ erent from what they are 
in the world of problems. On the object side, encroachment means that 
the data themselves are problematic, not transparent but ambiguous and 
potentially antinomic. On the subject side, encroachment means that the 
“immanent conditions of possibility,” which we recognize as Kantian lan-
guage for the transcendental ego, is equally problematic. Neither the in-
tentional act nor the intentional object is available to clear and distinct in-
tuition. Things are a bit muddy, opaque, elusive. We don’t know precisely 
with whom or with what we have to do, nor even who we ourselves are, 
and this condition is not temporary.
This leads us to ask who or what is doing this encroaching, and in what 
does this transgressing of the good fences that make good neighbors in the 
realm of the problematic consist. The answer seems to be participation, 
involvement, belonging, a relation of subject to object in which the neat, 
clean distinction between them gets compromised. Thus what I encounter 
as mystery is not outside or before me as much as in me, though this dis-
tinction itself tends to break down (PE 20, 22). The “object” is at once “too 
close up to us and too far away to be found in the strictly limited zone of 
objective knowledge” (HV 69).24 The intentional act “by which we incline 
ourselves towards a presence is essentially diﬀ erent from that through 
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which we grasp at an object . . . presence as such lies . . . beyond the grasp 
of any possible comprehension.” To illustrate what he means, Marcel im-
mediately writes, “A rose in a poem can be something that is present to us 
in this way, but not, in most cases, a rose in a seedsman’s catalogue.”25
Marcel warns against identifying this incomprehensibility with un-
knowability as if it were a problem that cannot be solved, lying outside 
the wall that constitutes the limit to our knowledge. It is to be conceived as 
something positive rather than negative, as a mode of presence (MB 261). 
Thus “mystery is not, as it is for the agnostic, construed as a lacuna in our 
knowledge, as a void to be fi lled, but rather as a certain plenitude” that 
resists “false certainties” and transcends our “Trieb zum Wissen” (CF 152).
On the object side, we fi nd a plenitude of presence that overwhelms 
our conceptual nets and tempts the positivist and the onto-theologian in 
us to resist by saying, Whatever my net doesn’t catch, isn’t a fi sh.”26 On 
the subject side, there is participation, what leads Marcel to write, “the 
more I actually participate in being, the less I am capable of knowing or 
of saying in what it is that I participate” (CF 56). We can take this both in-
tensively and extensively in relation, say, to marriage and parenting. The 
more deeply I commit myself to such relations, and, since depth oft en 
takes time, the longer I commit myself to such relations, the clearer it be-
comes that I cannot say adequately what marriage or parenting is. Here 
it is abundantly clear that I cannot reduce myself or my family to “the 
vital and the social functions” (PE 10) that are obviously and inevitably 
involved. The plenitude of presence of which Marcel speaks is the square 
peg that doesn’t fi t into the round hole of comprehension. At the very 
least Marcel’s distinction raises the question whether it is the proper task 
of the Christian thinker to “solve” the “problem” of evil or the “problem” 
of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. What if these are mysteries 
rather than problems?
What, then, are the advantages of embedding the life of faith within 
the category of mystery, of being ever mindful of the incomprehensibility 
of God, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Eucharist, and so forth in the 
discursive practices (language games) that shape and express our relation 
to these mysteries of faith? Marcel’s analysis suggests two answers.
First, if we avoid the category mistake of reducing the mysterious to the 
problematic, we will so far forth remain open to the possibility of revela-
tion, of hearing a voice not our own that is truly divine. This is not to say 
that one cannot speak of revelation or have a “high view” of Scripture 
within the categoreal world of the problem. That may well be a prett y 
good defi nition of fundamentalism. But if we already have God in a box, 
enclosed within our conceptual scheme, hearing is fi nished, and the prob-
lems are all solved, the questions all answered, or at least that is the goal 
that is thought to be all but achieved. If, on the other hand, we understand 
that God and God’s works of creation and redemption always overfl ow 
our understanding of them, we just may remain open to ever new and 
renewed hearing of the Voice that comes to us in revelation.27
A second reason to avoid world-slippage, the sliding of the life of faith 
from the world of mystery to the world of problems is that we avoid 
guaranteeing that our understanding of that life will be misunderstand-
ing. The world of problems, on Marcel’s analysis, is above all the world of 
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“technics”, the world of manipulation and mastery. When the life of faith 
slides into this world, one of two things happens. It either turns into magic 
or it secularizes itself. That is, it either retains the notion of the supernatu-
ral and seeks (like the onto-theologian) to employ it in the service of some 
human project, gett ing something desired or avoiding something feared 
by knowing how to manipulate the sacred power; or it gradually, perhaps 
imperceptably, reduces the supernatural to the natural, the sacred to the 
secular, the uncanny to the familiar.
I have put these two advantages negatively in terms of avoiding cat-
egory mistakes and world-slippage. Just as Heidegger warns against the 
danger of the world of modern technology,28 whose parent or grandparent 
onto-theology is, so Marcel warns against the danger of reducing myster-
ies to problems. This does not mean that thinking the life of faith in terms 
of mystery makes no contribution to playing the language game of faith 
bett er. It only means that the fi rst step along the path to spiritual growth 
is to be as sure as one can that one is playing the right game and not some 
other. One can’t get bett er at shooting free throws while playing hockey.
**********
Aft er writing that “the more I actually participate in being, the less I am 
capable of knowing or of saying in what it is that I participate” Marcel 
immediately links this thought to “the essential meaning of negative the-
ology”—the att empt to think “that central aﬃ  rmation which becomes so 
much a part of the one who utt ers it that he eventually becomes incapable 
of utt ering it” (CF 56–57). This provides a nice segue to the next site at 
which mystery is thematized in continental philosophy of religion, the 
phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion in its relation to the apophatic tradi-
tion in Christian theology.
Given the negative character of deconstruction, Jacques Derrida fi nds 
it necessary to distance his project from negative theology.29 In contrast 
to Pseudo-Dionysius, he notes that his wholesale negations do not 1) pre-
suppose a hyperessential deity 2) with whom mystical, silent union can 
be sought and 3) who can be addressed (as Trinity!) in prayer and enco-
mium.30 It is not Derrida’s negation of negative theology, however, that is 
of immediate interest here or even the renewed philosophical interest in 
apophaticism that has come in its wake.31 It is more specifi cally Jean-Luc 
Marion’s phenomenology of religion, which, in response to Derrida, he 
wishes to associate closely with Christian apophaticism. An important 
part of that response is a litany of Christian theologians who, like Philo 
the Jew, belong to the apophatic tradition by aﬃ  rming the incomprehen-
sibility of God: Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Ori-
gin, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostam, John of Damascus, Augustine, 
Bernard of Clairvaux, “even” Thomas Aquinas, and, of course, Pseudo-
Dionysius.32
It should be noted, though it is obvious, that these theologians are not 
simply silent about the divine mysteries. They have a lot to say about God, 
including, of course, the aﬃ  rmation of God’s incomprehensibility.33 This is 
something, it is claimed, that we can know about God. Pseudo-Dionysius, 
for example, writes a short treatise, The Mystical Theology, on how we can-
not speak about God, and a much longer treatise, The Divine Names, on 
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how we can and should speak about God. In the edition I use, they are 
seven and eighty-fi ve pages, respectively.34 Moreover, the longer treatise 
is followed by two others, The Celestial Hierarchy and The Ecclesiastical Hier-
archy, that are also signifi cantly longer than The Mystical Theology and talk 
freely about God. As is well known, Aquinas insists that we cannot in this 
life see the essence of God, that even when in rapture or the life to come 
we do see God’s essence we cannot comprehend what we see, and that “by 
the revelation of grace in this life we do not know of God what He is, and 
thus are united to Him as to one unknown.”35 But he has more than a litt le 
to say about God in his Summas, and not just negatively.
We are reminded of the lines from the epigraph to this essay that say 
of the Dao
Nameless, it is the beginning of Heaven and earth;
Named, it is the mother of the myriad creatures.
And so,
 Always eliminate desires in order to observe its mysteries;
 Always have desires in order to observe its manifestations.
(Emphasis added)
Like Taoist thought, Christian apophaticism involves a dialectic between 
the Nameless and the Named, between mysteries and manifestations, or, 
as Heidegger would put it, between concealment and unconcealment. We 
discover that we cannot speak, and then that we can and must. We speak, 
and then discover that what we speak of has at once escaped us and over-
whelmed us, rendering our speech inherently inadequate to its intended 
“object.” The tension between these discoveries is not (to be) resolved.
We fi nd this dialectical tension in Luther. He distinguishes the majes-
ty of “the naked God,” “the absolute God,” “God as He is in Himself” 
from the God clothed in “His Word and promises.” The latt er, of course, 
is the revealed God, but in the clothing of the Word and promises, God is 
“veiled in the sort of mask or face that is suited to us.”36 Luther insists on 
the “distinction between God preached and God hidden, that is, between 
the Word of God and God himself.” There are “secrets of God’s majesty, 
which it is impossible to penetrate because he dwells in light inaccessible, 
as Paul testifi es [I Tim. 6:16]. Let [human temerity] occupy itself instead 
with God incarnate,” the clothed God and not the hidden majesty.37 This 
“instead” should not be taken to mean that we pay att ention to the re-
vealed, clothed God and ignore the hidden, naked God. There is only one 
God, and Luther, who has been reading his Heidegger and Marcel, re-
minds the believer that this God remains concealed even in the midst of 
gracious unconcealment. Revelation is not the solving of a problem but 
the presence of a mystery.
What Marcel calls a mystery, Marion calls a saturated phenomenon.38 
In two important ways, these analyses mirror each other. First, the phe-
nomena in question are positive presences, quite literally overwhelmingly 
so (which is why they exceed our grasp). Their incomprehensibility is not 
due to lack or lacuna; rather, more is given to our potential cognition (in-
tuition, experience, observation) than our concepts can contain or our lan-
guage express. Kant’s contrast between the rational idea and the aesthetic 
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idea is helpful. The former can never become knowledge because “no ad-
equate intuition can ever be given” (for God, freedom, and immortality, or 
God, soul, and world). The latt er cannot become knowledge
but for an opposite reason: “because it is an intuition (of the imagi-
nation) for which no adequate [adäquat] concept can be found” . . . it 
is no longer a matt er of the nonadequation of the (lacking) intuition 
that leaves a (given) concept empty; it is a matt er, conversely, of a fail-
ure of the (lacking) concept that leaves the (overabundantly given) 
intuition blind. . . . Kant stresses this unambiguously: in the case of 
the aesthetic idea, the “representation of the imagination furnishes 
much to think [viel zu denken veranlasst], but to which no determinate 
thought, or concept, can be adequate [adäquat sein kann].” The excess 
of intuition over any concept also prohibits “that any language ever 
reach it completely and render it intelligible” . . . the intuitive over-
abundance is no longer exposed within rules, whatever they may 
be, but overwhelms them; intuition is no longer exposed within the 
concept, but saturates it and renders it overexposed—invisible, not 
by lack of light, but by excess of light.39
A second mirroring is that the analyses are phenomenological, not 
theological, and this in three ways:
1) A saturated phenomenon is a phenomenon. In other words, the “ob-
jects” we are talking about are given to our experience. They appear, can 
be observed, can be described as a certain type of phenomenon. Marcel’s 
notion of secondary refl ection (concrete or existential philosophy) corre-
sponds to his emphasis on data and the givenness of that which he de-
scribes as mystery.
2) While the category (mystery or saturated phenomenon) includes re-
ligiously signifi cant phenomena, which Marion will call epiphany or rev-
elation,40 as with Marcel these are by no means the only instances. Marion 
distinguishes four non-theological types of saturated phenomena: the 
event (such as the batt le of Waterloo), the idol (a curious name for the 
visual arts, especially the painting), the fl esh (the presence of the self as 
body to itself) and the icon (the gaze of the Other, in the Levinasian sense, 
the face).41
3) The inclusion of religiously signifi cant phenomena along with other 
types is not a sneaking of theological claims into philosophical discourse 
under phenomenological disguise, as Dominique Janicaud has alleged.42 
For, as Marion insists, the analysis is about the possibility of a certain kind 
of experience, not a claim about its validity or about the actuality of its in-
tentional object. This is a task for the theologian or other believers.43 Here
the phenomenon of revelation remains a mere possibility. I am go-
ing to describe it without presupposing its actuality. . . . If revelation 
there must be (and phenomenology has no authority to decide this), 
then it will assume, assumes, or [has] assumed the fi gure of para-
dox of paradoxes, according to an essential law of phenomenality. 
In this sense . . . revelation remains a variation of saturation.” (BG 
234–35)44
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Marion can fully agree with Marcel that while Christian faith may stimu-
late refl ection on this type of phenomenon, such refl ection neither pre-
supposes Christian faith nor proves its validity. It at most opens a space 
of possibility for a mode of experience, a type of phenomenon that we 
might otherwise overlook or, in the religious case, dogmatically exclude 
a priori.45
But the believing soul might well ask, What’s in it for me? What is 
the advantage for the life of faith of thinking the mysteries of faith in 
terms of incomprehensibility and of thinking this incomprehensibility as 
overfl owing presence and not just as elusive absence? We see Marion’s 
answer most clearly if we turn to his second major phenomenological 
theme: the distinction between the idol and the icon. Here ‘idol’ does not 
signify the “verbal icon” of the literary work of art nor, in Marion’s oth-
er usage, the visible icon of the plastic arts, especially the painting, but 
the physical representation of a deity used in such religious activities as 
prayer and sacrifi ce. We’re talking here about the golden calf (Ex. 32) and 
other gods of silver and gold against which the biblical writers protest 
(Ps. 115). Marion is no iconoclast; he has no interest in labeling all visible 
representations of deity inherently idolatrous. So he distinguishes the 
idol from the icon, neither physically in terms of sensible representa-
tion nor theologically in terms of the names of the gods represented and 
the practices att ached thereto, but in terms of the mode of intentional-
ity. A statue, a picture, a talisman functions as an idol if the gaze that 
intends it is satisfi ed or fi lled in the mere act of looking, if it stops, rests, 
or freezes in its gazing. It does not “transpierce” its intentional object. 
In other words, the object itself is the sacred power, and there is no need 
for the gaze to intend anything invisible beyond it whose mediator or 
sacrament it is. It is the real presence of the divine because it is all there 
is of the divine.46
Idolatry in this sense may well be quite rare; much that is so labeled 
by biblical writers and others may well be understood in a more incar-
national way, such that the visible is a locus or bearer or mediator of a 
sacred reality that exceeds its localized, visible presence. I suppose the test 
would be whether the god in question would be considered dead when 
the wooden statue that bore his name was destroyed in a temple fi re or, 
like the Philistine god Dagon, lost his head and his hands in a fall.47
By contrast with the idol, the icon is a visible that is understood, as a 
kind of metaphysical John the Baptist, to point beyond itself to the invis-
ible that exceeds it. But it is not merely a sign that in its presence points to 
something absent. It is rather “saturated litt le by litt le with the invisible. 
The invisible seems [becomes phenomenon], it appears in a semblance. 
. . . In this sense, the formula that Saint Paul applies to Christ, eikōn tou 
theou tou aoratou, icon of the invisible God (Gal. 1:15), must serve as our 
norm. . . . Hence this implies that, even presented by the icon, the invis-
ible always remains invisible” (GWB 17). And yet, we must also say in a 
dialectical tone of voice, that it becomes visible. In the icon the invisible 
becomes present.
Already Marion’s distinction between idol and icon maps nicely 
onto his account of revelation as epiphany, in which the sensible be-
comes the bearer, indeed the overfl owing, overwhelming presence of the 
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supersensible.48 But, as if with reference to Heidegger’s critique of onto-
theology, he argues that there is conceptual as well as physical idolatry 
(GWB 16–24). The former occurs when our conceptual scheme or lan-
guage stops or freezes our thought. Just as the physical idol simply is 
the divine, because it contains all there is of the sacred, so conceptual 
idolatry occurs when we assume that our concepts and our language 
are adequate to God, that God fi ts into our conceptual cookie cutt ers 
without remainder, that God’s presence is contained within the levees 
of our language without overfl owing them. In this case as in the pre-
vious case, the idolater “remains in possession of the idol, its solitary 
master” (GWB 24).
By contrast, the conceptual icon represents the sacred in the awareness 
of the inadequation of our thought and language to their intended refer-
ent. We are neither possessor nor master. It is not the content that is at is-
sue. One and the same statement can be idolatrous or iconic depending on 
the mode in which it is intended. At issue once again is the “how” rather 
than the “what.”
This is but the briefest sketch of a phenomenology that revolves around 
the distinction between idol and icon and the notion of the saturated phe-
nomenon, which may be thought as another name for icon. But enough 
has been said to answer the question of the believing soul: what’s in it for 
me? Why should I understand my faith in this way? The answer is quite 
simple: to avoid idolatry. The god whose representations, whether physi-
cal or conceptual, are not iconic, is an idol in the strictest sense. It is a god 
created by and made in the image of the artisans and thinkers who fashion 
them. That is why Marion describes the idol as the mirror image of the 
idolater (GWB 11–15, 20–22).
We have looked at three accounts of the use or advantage for the life of 
faith of understanding itself in terms of mystery. We might summarize as 
follows:
For Heidegger it is to keep the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob from 
becoming the god of the philosophers and thereby religiously otiose.
For Marcel it is the avoid the world slippage in which the religious life 
either dissolves into secularism or degenerates into magic.
For Marion it is to avoid idolatry.
While these three warnings are not exactly synonymous, I hope it is clear 
that they bleed into and reinforce one another, that they form a kind of 
Hebrew parallelism, saying more or less the same thing diﬀ erently. It 
might be a useful exercise to try to think how each is a commentary on 
the other two.
Some may be disturbed by the recurring notion that thinking God as 
mystery means that our God-talk never passes the adequation test. What 
then about truth? This is the point at which I think we need to read Aqui-
nas’s doctrine of analogy and Gadamer’s theory of interpretation simul-
taneously and through Kantian glasses. But rather than try to spell that 
out, I oﬀ er a crude but, I hope, illuminating parable. My three year old 
grandson has found a quarter and is sucking on it. I tell him he shouldn’t 
do that, and, of course, he asks Why? Quite apart from the limits of my 
own knowledge of viruses and bacteria, I know that he is not in a position 
to understand the truth of the matt er. So I say, “Well, its sort of like this. 
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There are litt le tiny bugs on coins, so small you can’t see them. But if they 
get inside you they can make you really sick. Do you remember how aw-
ful you felt last time you were sick?”
Now strictly speaking, this is not true. It does not pass the adequation 
test. There are no tiny six-legged critt ers on the coin. But for a three year 
old, it may well be the best “truth” available, the closest approximation. 
It is surely bett er than telling him that if he sucks on coins his favorite 
trains will get broken. At this point in my fable, I’m reminded of one of 
my teachers, who used to say that the Bible is the “divinely revealed mis-
information about God.”49 The purpose of this “misinformation” is not to 
mislead but to give the best understanding of which we are capable and to 
guide our behavior for our own good. The point is not that we can’t apply 
our words or our concepts to the mysteries of faith but rather that they 
will always fall short of adequately expressing a reality that overfl ows and 
overwhelms them.
**********
I have spoken positively of the importance of mystery for the life of 
faith. But there is another side to it, and one might speak of the use 
and abuse of mystery for religious thought. Unfortunately, it seems that 
Foucault is right when he says “that everything is dangerous, which is 
not exactly the same as bad.”50 So I turn to the prophet Feuerbach, who 
warns us about a religiously dangerous way of proposing that God is 
unknowable:
On the ground that God is unknowable, man excuses himself to 
what is yet remaining of his religious conscience for his forgetful-
ness of God, his absorption in the world: he denies God practically 
by his conduct,—the world has possession of all his thoughts and 
inclinations,—but he does not deny him theoretically, he does not at-
tack his existence; he lets that rest. But this existence does not aﬀ ect or 
incommode him; it is a merely negative existence, an existence without 
existence . . . a state of being which, as to its eﬀ ects, is not distinguish-
able from non-being. . . . The alleged religious horror of limiting God 
by positive predicates is only the irreligious wish to know nothing 
more of God, to banish God from the mind.51
To use the incomprehensibility of God as an excuse to abandon the 
hard work involved in seeking the best ways to speak about God or as a 
fi lter to eliminate anything that might “incommode” us is to continue in 
another mode the project of staying in charge that motivates the slippage 
from pious thought to onto-theology, from mystery to problems, and from 
icon to idol. Unlike many of my friends in this Society, I fi nd Derridean 
deconstruction to be an illuminating mode of Kantian critique. But when 
he tries to incorporate his “religion without religion” into his overall proj-
ect, it seems to me that with the help of his “generalized apophatics” he 
becomes an instance of what Feuerbach is talking about.52 The fl ight from 
content and commitment leaves us, I fear, with very thin soup indeed, 
perhaps having a “form of godliness but denying its power” (2 Tim. 3:5).53 
No doubt there are other instances.
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But I want to conclude with a fi nal reference to the upside of mystery. 
Faith has been defi ned by someone as “giving all I know of myself to all I 
know of God.” Beyond the anti-Platonic reminder that faith involves the 
whole person and is not simply a defective mode of cognition, what I like 
about this account is the suggestion that as a believer I am not transparent 
to myself, that God is not the only mystery in this relation. Judith Butler 
has recently refl ected on the ethical signifi cance of the self’s unsurpassable 
opaqueness to itself.54 A thorough examination of the religious benefi ts 
of understanding that we do not fully understand ourselves, that just as 
only God knows who God is, so only God knows who I am (Psalm 139), 
would be a great service to those for whom thought is faith seeking under-
standing. But that is a task for another time, another place, and no doubt 
another thinker.
For the present I invoke Anne Lamott , whose two favorite prayers are
“Help me, help me, help me” and
“Thank you, thank you, thank you.”
In the very closing lines of Traveling Mercies she writes, “I can’t help but 
say again what I said on the beach that day, in a whisper this time and 




1. The opening lines, as translated in Readings in Classical Chinese Philoso-
phy, ed. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: 
Hackett , 2001), p. 163. 
2. This paper was delivered at the Midwest Regional Meeting of the So-
ciety of Christian Philosophers on “Christianity and Mystery” held at Notre 
Dame in April of 2006.
3. The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W., Harvey (New York: Oxford, 1958), 
p. 28. Emphasis added. Thus ‘mysterium’ is more closely linked to ‘tremendum’ 
than to ‘fascinans’. In discussing Ott o in class I once found myself saying, with-
out having planned to, “If it isn’t scary, it isn’t God.” Perhaps the hasty assur-
ances that biblical references to “the fear of the Lord” signify merely respect 
are more products of wishful thinking than of insight.
4. Introduction to “What is Metaphysics?” (1949) in Pathmarks, ed William 
McNeill (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 287–88. Cf. Iden-
tity and Diﬀ erence, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 
pp. 58–61, 69. Henceforth WM/1949 and ID, respectively.
5. Thus the tradition of onto-theology extends from Anaximander to Ni-
etzsche, for whom the Boundless or Infi nite and the Will to Power, respec-
tively, play the role of Highest Being. Spinoza’s Deus sive natura and Hegel’s 
Gott  oder Geist are other examples. See note 9 below.
6. See “Aquinas and Onto-Theology” in American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2 (2006), pp. 173–91.. Here I argue that Aquinas is not 
an onto-theologian in even this restricted sense since, following, as it were, 
THE IMPORTANCE OF MYSTERY FOR THE LIFE OF FAITH 381
Heidegger’s dictum that being is always the being of some being, he tries to 
think being in terms of the diﬀ erence between the being of the Creator and 
that of creatures.
7. There are, of course, other categories and other principles that can be 
taken to be at the core of what calls itself “Reason”, and Heidegger’s account 
can easily be generalized.
8. See the title essay in my Overcoming Onto-theology (New York: Ford-
ham University Press, 2001), pp. 11–12. Henceforth OO. This essay and 
the one cited in note 6 provide an introductory overview of Heidegger on 
onto-theology.
9. See Postscript to “What is Metaphysics?” (1943), in Pathmarks, pp. 234–38 
and Lett er on “Humanism,” in Pathmarks, pp. 243, 249, 255. On the project of 
eliminating mystery in the onto-theologies of Spinoza and Hegel, see my Tran-
scendence and Self-Transcendence: On God and the Soul (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2004), chaps. 2 and 3.
10. The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt  (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1977), p. 26. Henceforth QT
11. “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead’” in QT 63–64. Too many care-
less readers, paying att ention only to the partial and preliminary defi nition, 
talk as if one needs only to say “onto-theology” in a solemn tone of voice to 
eliminate any form of theism from the fi eld of serious discussion.
12. Hence the later Heidegger’s turn to poetry aft er giving up on Christi-
anity in both its Catholic and Protestant forms.
13. I speak deliberately of the life of faith rather than just of faith in or-
der to avoid reducing the question to the epistemological dimensions, which 
have their rightful place. Whereas for Plato pistis is either a failed att empt at 
knowledge or an inferior mode thereof, for biblical thought faith is more than 
its cognitive dimension. It is, among other things, trust in the promises of God 
and obedience to the commands of God. The life of faith is a life of prayer in 
its fi ve modes: confession, praise, thanksgiving, petition, and intercession.
14. Or, perhaps, a similar role in the state’s project of economic/military 
mastery.
15. In Leslie F. Brandt’s free paraphrase: Psalms/Now (St. Louis: Concordia, 
1973), p. 175. The psalm in this case is 109, but the paraphrase does not pro-
ceed verse by verse.
16. If by fi deism is meant the resistance to this demand, the acknowledg-
ment that “we walk by faith, not by sight” and can never fully transform the 
former into the lighter, then it seems to me that every Christian should be a 
fi deist. If the role of the Holy Spirit in leading to faith as a gift  is recognized, 
it will be clear that we are not talking about an arbitrary human decision to 
believe, to trust, and to obey.
17. “The Age of the World Picture” in QT 128, 134.
18. Our knowledge can be said to be doubly relative. It is relative in com-
parison to the divine knowledge, which along deserves to be called absolute; 
and, at least in such crucial domains as politics, ethics, and religion, it can be 
seen to be relative to the historically contingent and conceptually particular 
cultural worlds from which it emerges in a relation of mutual legitimation.
19. We might remember the crusades, the wars of religion, the inquisitions 
in which so much blood was shed, but also the rhetorical violence of those 
creedal statements that ended with an Anathema (to hell with you—God 
damn you) addressed to anyone who dared to disagree on any point.
20. Creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2002), p. 136. Henceforth CF.
21. The similarity does not entail the absence of diﬀ erence. “I would reply 
that there is no question of confusing those mysteries which are enveloped 
382 Faith and Philosophy
in human experience as such with those mysteries which are revealed, such 
as the Incarnation or Redemption, and to which no eﬀ ort of thought bearing 
on experience can enable us to att ain” The Philosophy of Existentialism, trans. 
Manya Harari (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 45. Henceforth PE.
22. PE 44–46. Emphasis added. Cf. CF 79–80, 134–36.
23. Cf. Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysics of Hope, trans. Emma 
Craufurd (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 69. Henceforth HV.
24. Perhaps no clearer or more dramatic instance of the dialectic of in me/
before me and of too close/too far is to be found than that which Augustine 
presents in his Confessions, in which he can fi nd the radically transcendent 
God only by turning inward.
25. The Mystery of Being, Vol. I, Refl ection & Mystery, trans. G. S. Fraser (Chi-
cago: Henry Regnery, 1960), p. 256. Henceforth MB.
26. My teacher, John Smith, was fond of this description of the positivist, 
though it fi ts the onto-theologian and fundamentalist as well. I do not know 
its source.
27. Perhaps this is at least part of the meaning of epectasis as developed by 
Gregory of Nyssa and later by Gregory Palamas. See From Glory to Glory: Texts 
from Gregory of Nyssa’s Mystical Writings, trans. Herbert Musurillo, S. J. (Crest-
wood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995), especially pp. 46–71 and my 
discussion in Transcendence and Self-Transcendence, pp. 109–110.
28. Especially in QT.
29. Though John D. Caputo has illuminatingly called deconstruction a 
“generalized apophatics.” See The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion 
without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 28, 32, 55. 
The main texts of Derrida are: “Diﬀ érance” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. 
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1982); “How to Avoid Speak-
ing: Denials” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward & Toby Fo-
shay (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); and “Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum)” in On the 
Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
30. See especially “How to Avoid Speaking.”
31. In addition to Derrida and Negative Theology, see Flight of the Gods: Philo-
sophical Perspectives on Negative Theology, ed. Ilse N. Bulhof and Laurens ten 
Kate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).
32. “In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of ‘Negative Theology’” in God, 
the Gift , and Postmodernism, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 34–35. On the relation of the last 
two mentioned, see Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of 
Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005). On the apophat-
icism of Augustine and Aquinas in relation to Pseudo-Dionysius, see chapters 
4 and 5 of Transcendence and Self-Transcendence.
33. I emphasize the aﬃ  rmative character of apophaticism to remind us of 
Marcel’s insistence that mystery is not so much a lacuna as something posi-
tive, a presence in which we participate without capturing it in the creel of our 
categoreal scheme.
34. Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1987).
35. Summa Theologiae, I, 12, 13, Reply Obj. 1.
36. Commentary on Psalm 51 in Luther’s Works, Vol. 12, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan 
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955), pp. 312–312. For a related 
theme in Calvin, see Ford Lewis Batt les, “God Was Accommodating Himself 
to Human Capacity” in Readings in Calvin’s Theology, ed. Donald K. McKim 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1984).
37. The Bondage of the Will, in Luther’s Works, Vol. 33, ed. ed. Philip S. Wat-
son (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), pp. 140, 145. In these later texts it is 
THE IMPORTANCE OF MYSTERY FOR THE LIFE OF FAITH 383
especially the will of God that remains hidden. Thus “it is not permissible for 
men to pry into the will of the Divine Majesty” (p. 147). It is precisely as per-
sonal that God is incomprehensible.
38. The key texts are: “The Saturated Phenomenon” in Dominique Jani-
caud, et al., Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French Debate (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2000); Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology 
of Givenness (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); and In Excess: Studies 
of Saturated Phenomena (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002). Hence-
forth SP, BG, and IE, respectively. An important essay on Pseudo-Dionysius 
is found in The Idol and Distance: Five Studies (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2001). In a key link to Heidegger, the saturated phenomenon does not 
obey the principle of suﬃ  cient reason. See SP 178–81.
39. SP 195–97. The internal quotations from Kant are from Critique of Judge-
ment, ¶¶ 57 and 49 respectively, Academy edition, V, 342 and 314.
40. Thus an example would be the transfi guration of Jesus. I discuss and 
defend this instance in “Transfi guration as Saturated Phenomenon” in Be-
tween Description and Interpretation: The Hermeneutic Turn in Phenomenology, ed. 
Andrzej Wierciński (Toronto: The Hermeneutic Press, 2005), pp. 501–12. An 
earlier and briefer version of this essay appeared in Journal of Philosophy and 
Scripture, www.philosophyandscripture.org, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2003, no pages.
41. A brief presentation of these four is found in BG 228–33, while chapters 
2–5 of IE are given over to more extended development. Revelation is given as 
a fi ft h type, with elements of each of the other four (BG 234–41).
42. He raises this objection against Marion and others in The Theological 
Turn of French Phenomenology, included in Phenomenology and the “Theological 
Turn.”
43. Marion oft en writes as a (Catholic) theologian. But given this distinc-
tion, it is easy to diﬀ erentiate his theological from his phenomenological 
claims.
44. Cf. BG 242. In both BG and IE Marion uses the Kierkegaardian lan-
guage of paradox when speaking about the saturated phenomenon. Marcel, it 
will be recalled, uses the Kantian language of antinomy.
45. A close reading will reveal that this latt er is precisely what Janicaud 
does. See note 42.
46. God Without Being, trans. Thomas Carlson (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1991), pp. 7–15. Henceforth GWB.
47. 1 Sam. 5. Apparently the Philistines did not think this to be the end of 
Dagon.
48. It would be easy to apply this analysis for Karl Barth’s presentation of 
the Word of God in its threefold sense: the revealed, that is incarnate Word ; 
the writt en Word, that is the Bible; and the preached Word. In each case, by the 
gracious agency of the Holy Spirit, an empirical reality becomes the presence 
of the very voice of God, which, like the peace of God, “surpasses all under-
standing” (Phil 4:7).
49. He was neither a Thomist nor a Kantian and most likely was thinking 
along Calvinist lines. See the Batt les essay mentioned in note 36.
50. “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 231.
51. The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1957), pp. 14–15. Emphasis added.
52. The phrase “religion without religion” echoes Feuerbach’s “existence 
without existence.”
53. For a clear (and sympathetic) account of Derrida’s “religion without re-
ligion,” see Caputo’s Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida as per note 29 above.
384 Faith and Philosophy
54. See Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2005).
55. (New York: Random House, 2000), pp. 82 and 272.
